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Foreign Capital Inflow, Technology  




According to Jones and Marjit (1992), in a two-sector, full-employment model it 
is not possible to show that growth in the foreign capital employed in the export sector of 
a small open economy will lead to a fall in the welfare in the presence of a protected 
import-competing sector.  In this short paper, we have shown that one may get the 
immiserising result even in this framework if the inflow of foreign capital into the export 
sector is accompanied by technology transfer, which leads to a fall in the labour-output 
ratio in this sector. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The effects of inflow of foreign capital in the developing countries have been 
investigated intensively by both trade and development theorists.  Brecher and 
Alejandro (1977) have analysed the welfare effects of foreign capital inflow in a 
two-commodity, two-factor full employment model; and Khan (1982) has considered 
a mobile capital Harris-Todaro model with urban unemployment.  The important 
result, common to both, is the following: the inflow of foreign capital with full 
repatriation of its earnings is necessarily immiserising if the import-competing sector 
is capital-intensive and is protected by a tariff.  However, in the absence of any tariff, 
the foreign capital inflow with full repatriation of its earnings does not affect 
welfare.  Here welfare is defined as a positive function of national income.   
In the literature, the Brecher-Alejandro proposition has also been re-examined 
in terms of the three-sector models.  The third sector may either be a duty-free zone 
(DFZ) (sometimes called foreign enclave), as in the works of Beladi and Marjit   
(1992, 1992a), or it may be an urban informal sector, as in the works of Grinols 
(1991), Chandra and Khan (1993), and Gupta (1997).  The work of Beladi and Marjit 
(1992) is a simple three-sector extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
framework, where the third sector, the DFZ, uses sector-specific foreign capital that 
is foreign-owned.  They have shown that with full-repatriation of foreign capital 
income, growth in the foreign capital can lead to immiserisation in the presence of 
tariff-distortion even if the foreign capital is employed in the export sector.  This 
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generalises the main result in the existing literature, which primarily focuses on 
foreign capital movement in the protected sector of the economy. 
However, according to Jones and Marjit (1992), in a two-sector, full-
employment model it is impossible to show that growth in the foreign capital 
employed in the export sector of a small economy will lead to immiserisation.   Only 
a 3×3 model of trade and production will lead to such a result.   The intuition behind 
the result is as follows.  If the inflow of foreign capital to the export sector of the 
economy increases, it would expand and requires more of the mobile factor.  As a 
consequence, the import-competing sector contracts because of the scarcity of the 
mobile factor.  This raises the national income of the economy at world prices 
through a decrease in the distortionary effect of tariff protection.   
The purpose of the present paper is very simple.  I shall show that if the 
inflow of foreign capital into the export sector of an economy is accompanied by a 
technology transfer which lowers the labour-output ratio in the export sector,
1 one 
may still be able to derive condition under which the immiserising result is obtained 
in a two commodity-three factor, full-employment model in the presence of a tariff-
protected import-competing sector.   
 
2.  THE MODEL 
We consider a 2×3 specific factor full-employment model.  Sector 1 produces 
the export commodity using labour and capital of type 1.   Sector 2 is the traditional 
import-competing sector, which produces its output with the help of labour and 
capital of type 2.  By our small open economy assumption the prices of the final 
commodity are given internationally.   However, sector 2 is protected by a tariff, t.  
So its domestic price P2
* is different from the world price P2.   Factors of production 
are fully utilised and their endowments are given exogenously.   However, the stock 
of capital of type 1 can increase by an inflow of foreign capital. Production functions 
exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal productivity to each 
factor. 
The following symbols will be used in the equations: 
  aKi  =  capital-output ratio in the ith sector, i = 1,2; 
  aLi  =  labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i = 1,2; 
  Pi  =  world price of the ith good, i = 1,2; 
  P2
*  =  domestic price or the tariff-inclusive price of good 2; 
  t  =  ad-valorem rate of tariff on good 2; 
  Xi  = output  of  the  ith good, i = 1,2; 
  W  =  wage rate of labour; 
  ri  =  return to capital of the ith type, i = 1,2; 
1The new seed-fertiliser technology, commonly known as the Green Revolution, which was 
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  L
*  =  fixed amount of supply of labour; 
  Ki
*  =  fixed stock of capital of the ith type, i = 1,2; 
  A  =  state of technology in the production of good 1; 
  ∧ = proportional  change. 
A general equilibrium of the system is represented by the following set of 
equations: 
W.aL1 + r1.aK1 = P1                 …  …  …  …  …  (1) 
W.aL2 + r2.aK2 = 
*
2 P   … … … … …  (2) 
aL1 = aL1(W/r1, A(
*
1 K )) … … … … …  (3) 
              (–)    (–)  (+) 
aK1. X1 = 
*
1 K   … … … … …  (4) 
aK2. X2 = 
*
2 K   … … … … …  (5) 
aL1. X1 + aL2. X2 = L
*  … … … … …  (6) 
Equation (3) states that the labour-output ratio is a decreasing function of both the 
wage-rental ratio in sector 1 as well as the state of technology while the latter is a positive 
function of the capital stock of type 1.  As 
*
1 K  increases due to an inflow of foreign 
capital, it ushers in a more labour-saving technical progress, which lowers the labour-
output ratio aL1 in that sector.  However, it does not affect the capital-output ratio aK1. 
We should note that the production structure described by (1) – (6) depicts an 
indecomposable system.  So input prices are not determined by product prices alone.  
Equations (1) and (2) describe a competitive equilibrium, whereas Equations (4) – (6) are 
the full-employment conditions.  Given 
*
1 K  there are five equations (namely, Equations 
(1) – (2) and (4) – (5)) to solve for five unknowns (W, r1, r2, X1, and X2).  Once we know 
the factor prices, for given 
*
1 K , all the factor coefficients are also known. 
Before going to comparative statics, it is important to mention that our 
measure of welfare in this small open economy is national income at international 
prices, Y, and it is expressed as follows. 
Y  =  W.L
* +  + r2.K
* − t.P2.X2  … … … …  (7) 
Here without the loss of any generality, we assume that the entire stock of 
capital of type 1 is foreign-owned and its return is fully repatriated. 
 
2.1.  The Effects of an Increase in 
* K1  
Owing to an inflow of foreign capital, the stock of foreign capital in the 
economy 
*
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the factor prices and the levels of production of the two sectors.   Using  (4) and (5), 
Equation (6) can be rewritten as 
(aL1/aK1).
*
1 K  + (aL2/aK2).
*
2 K  = L
*          …  …  …       …           (6.1) 
We should note that in this model the three factor prices, W, r1 and r2, are 
determined by solving Equations (1), (2), and (6.1) simultaneously.  Now taking total 
derivatives of these three equations we respectively, get
2 
θL1.W ˆ  + θK1 1 ˆ r  = − (∂aL1/∂A).A′.(W/P1).d
*
1 K    …  …  …  (1.1)                   
θL2.W ˆ  + θK2 2 ˆ r =  0  ;  and  … … … … … (2.1)     
(σ1.λL1+σ2.λL2).W ˆ −σ1.λL1 1 ˆ r −σ2.λL2 2 ˆ r =(d
*
1 K  /L
*).[(aL1/aK1)+   
(K1*/aK1).(∂aL1/∂A).A′] … … … … … (6.2) 
 
where λL1 = (aL1. X1/L
*); λL2 = (aL2. X2/L
*); θij = share of the ith
 input in the jth 
industry for i = L, K; j = 1, 2; σj = [(d(aKj/aLj) / d(W/rj)).((W/rj) / (aKj/aLj))] is the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the jth industry and the circum 
flex denotes a proportional change.   
Using Cramer’s rule from (1.1), (2.1), and (6.2) we can solve
3 
 W ˆ = (λL1.θK2/∆).Z.  
*
1 ˆ K ;    … … … … … (8.1) 
2 ˆ r  = − (λL1.θL2 / ∆).Z.  
*
1 ˆ K ;  and,    … … … … (8.2) 
1 ˆ r = − (θL1.θK2 /∆).[λL1 + E.{λL1.(1 + σ1) + λL2.(σ2 / θK2)}].
*
1 ˆ K    …  (8.3)  
where, ∆ = {θL1.θK2.σ1.(aL1/aK1). 
*
1 K  +  θK1.[θL2.σ2. 
*
2 K  + θK2.(σ1. 
*
1 K .(aL1/aK1) +   
                  σ2. 
*
2 K )]}  >  0; 
Z = [θK1 + E.(θK1 − θL1.σ1)]; 
and, E = {(∂aL1/∂A).A′.(
*
1 K /aL1)} is the elasticity of the labour-output ratio in the 
export sector with respect to the size of foreign capital stock and E < 0 since 
(∂aL1/∂A) < 0. 
From (8.1 − 8.2) it follows that W ˆ  < 0 and  2 ˆ r  > 0 iff  
Z=[θK1+E.(θK1− θL1.σ1)]    <  0  … … … … …  (9) 
From (9) one can observe that if (i) σ1 is sufficiently low and (ii) E is 
sufficiently negative, then the condition may be satisfied. 
2Equation (6.2) has been derived in Appendix I. 
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Now from (5) one can derive 
2 ˆ X = −  2 ˆK a            (since 
*
2 K  does not change) 
or,  2 ˆ X = θL2.σ2.( 2 ˆ r  – W ˆ ) 
 
Using (8) this becomes  
2 ˆ X =−(θL2.σ2/∆).Z.λL1.
*
1 ˆ K >0 iff Z<0.      … … … …  (10) 












1 K )   …  …  (7.1) 
                                 (−)                     (+)                            (+) 






1 K .∆).[λL1.θK2+λL2.t.σ2].Z    … … …  (7.2) 
From (7.2) it is evident that 
(dY/d
*
1 K )  <  0 iff Z < 0. 
Thus, an inflow of foreign capital into the export sector of the economy is 
immiserising if and only if condition (9) is satisfied.   
The intuition behind this result is quite clear.  The key issue is whether the 
output of the protected import-competing sector rises or not.  Since the import-
competing sector is not affected directly due to an inflow of foreign capital, 
everything hinges on the direction of movement of the export sector’s labour demand 
schedule.  On the one hand, the foreign capital inflow tends to increase labour 
demand by the export sector; and on the other, the labour-saving technology transfer 
tends to reduce it.  When condition (9) is satisfied, the second effect dominates.  As a 
consequence, W falls and r2 increases.  Producers in sector 2 will adopt a more 
labour-intensive technique of production.  Hence, the capital-output ratio of the 
tariff-protected import-competing sector, aK2, falls and the output, X2, increases since 
capital of type 2 is fully utilised.  The economy’s welfare measured by national 
income at world prices decreases if the increased cost of tariff-protection (as X2 
increases) outweighs the increase in domestic factor incomes.  This happens if 
condition (9) is satisfied. 
 
3.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The standard result in the theory of trade is that an inflow of foreign capital 
into the protected import-competing sector of a small open economy with full 
repatriation of foreign capital income leads to a fall in the welfare of the economy.  
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This is known as the famous ‘immiserising’ result of foreign capital inflow.  Beladi 
and Marjit (1992) have generalised this result by showing that one may get the 
immiserising effects of foreign capital inflow even if the foreign capital flows into 
the export sector of the economy.  However, Jones and Marjit (1992) have pointed 
out that to show the immiserising result in the latter case in a full-employment 
framework, one requires at least a three-sector model.  In a two-sector, full-
employment model it is not possible to show that growth in the foreign capital 
employed in the export sector of a small open economy will lead to such a result.  In 
this short paper, I have shown that we may get the immiserising result even in this 
framework if the inflow of foreign capital into the export sector is accompanied by  
technology transfer, and that it leads to a fall in the labour-output ratio in this sector.  
However, the rate of fall in the labour-output ratio must be such that the wage rate of 
labour (the inter-sectoral mobile factor) falls due to an increase in foreign capital 
inflow.  If the wage rate falls, the rental rate on domestic capital engaged in the 
import-competing sector will rise, leading to a fall in the capital-output ratio in this 
sector.  Full-employment of domestic capital leads to an expansion of the import-
competing sector of the economy and, thus, the welfare of the economy may fall 







Differentiating Equation (6.1) and after putting  dK2
* = dL
* = 0, we get 
(aL1/aK1).dK1
* + K1
*.[{aK1.( ) / ( / 1 1 r W aL ∂ ∂ ).d(W/r1) + ( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ).  A′.d K1




  σ2.(W ˆ − 2 ˆ r ).(aL2/aK2).K2
* = 0 
or,  K1
*.σ1(W ˆ − 1 ˆ r ).(aL1/aK1) + σ2  (W ˆ − 2 ˆ r )(aL2/aK2).K2
* = dK1
*.[(aL1/aK1) +   
( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ) A′.(K1
*/aK1)] 
or, σ1.(W ˆ − 1 ˆ r ).aL1X1  + σ2 (W ˆ − 2 ˆ r ).aL2.  X2  = (dK1
*/aK1).[aL1  +  K1
*.( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ). A′] 
(obtained after using Equations (4) and (5)) 
or, σ1.λL1.(W ˆ − 1 ˆ r ) + σ2λL2 (W ˆ − 2 ˆ r ) = (dK1
*/aK1.L
*) [aL1 +  K1
*.( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ). A′] 
or,  W ˆ .(σ1  λL1  +  σ2λL2)  −  1 ˆ r σ1.λL1  −  2 ˆ r σ2.λL2  =  (dK1
*/L
*).[(aL1/aK1)  +           
( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ) A′.(K1
*/ aK1)]    … … … … …  (6.2) Foreign Capital Inflow, Technology Transfer, and National Income  55
APPENDIX II 
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……….....…..        (A.1)  
Here, ∆ = θL1 θK2 σ1 λL1 + θK1.[ θL2 σ2 λL2 + θK2(σ1 λL1  + σ2 λL2)] 
Using (4) it becomes 
∆ = {θL1 θK2 σ1(aL1/aK1) 
*
1 K  +  θK1.[ θL2 σ2 
*
2 K  +  θK2.(σ1 
*
1 K .(aL1/aK1) +  σ2 
*
2 K )]} > 0. 
 
Solving (A.1) by Cramer’s rule we get 




                                         + θK1.θK2.{(aL1/aK1) + (
*
1 K /aK1). ( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ). A′}(d
*
1 K  /L
*)] 
     = (1/∆) [E.{(θL1σ1 λL1/ K1





       = (θK2 d
*
1 K  /∆) [E.{(θK1λL1/ 
*
1 K ) − (θL1σ1 λL1/ 
*
1 K )} + (θK1λL1/ 
*
1 K )] 
    = (λL1θK2).Z.
*
1 ˆ K     … … … … … … (8.1) 
2 ˆ r = (1/∆) [− θK1θL2{(aL1/aK1)+ (
*




                                                                           +( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ) A′ (W/P1).θL2.σ1λL1.dK1
*] 
      = (1/∆) [−(θK1/ L
*) (aL1/aK1).{1+ ( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ).(A′/aL1).  
*
1 K }  
                                      + (aL1.W/P1
*
1 K ).σ1.λL1.{( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ).( A′.
*
1 K  /aL1)}].θL2 d
*
1 K       
     =
 (θL2.d
*
1 K /∆) [− (θK1.aL1X1/ L
*.
*
1 K ).{1+ E} + (θL1σ1 λL1.E /
*
1 K )] 
     = (θL2.λL1.
*
1 ˆ K /∆) [E.(θL1σ1 − θK1) − θK1] 
     = − (θL2.λL1. 
*
1 ˆ K /∆) [θK1 + E.(θK1 − θL1σ1)] 
    = −(θL2.λL1/∆).Z. 
*
1 ˆ K     … … … … … …  (8.2)       
and, 
1 ˆ r = (1/∆).[− θL1θK2 {(aL1/aK1) + ( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ). A′.(
*




                                − ( A aL ∂ ∂ / 1 ). A′.(W/P1).dK1*.{θL2 σ2 λL2 + θK2.(σ1 λL1 +  σ2λL2)}] Sarbajit Chaudhuri  56





1 K ).{θL2.σ2.λL2 + θK2.(σ1.λL1 +  
σ2λL2)}] 
   = − (1/∆).
*
1 ˆ K .[θL1θK2λL1.  (1+E) + θL1E.{θL2 σ2 λL2  +  θK2 (σ1.λL1 +  σ2λL2)}] 
   = − (
*
1 ˆ K /∆).θL1.[θK2λL1 + E.{θK2λL1  +  θL2 σ2.λL2   +  θK2 (σ1 λL1 +  σ2λL2)}] 
   = − (θL1θK2/∆) [λL1 +  E {λL1 (1+ σ1) + λL2 (σ2/θK2)}]. 
*
1 ˆ K   
(obtained after using θL2 = 1 − θK2)    … … … … (8.3) 
 
APPENDIX III 
Using (8.1), (8.2), and (10) from (7.1) we may write 
(dY/d
*
1 K ) = (λL1 / ∆.
*
1 K ).Z.[L
*.θK2.W − θL2.r2. 
*
2 K  + t.P2.θL2.σ2.X2] 
                  =  (λL1.L
*.W / ∆.
*
1 K ).Z.[θK2 + λL2.(t.σ2 − θK2)] 
                  =  (λL1.L
*.W / ∆.
*
1 K ).Z.[θK2.(1 − λL2) + λL2.t.σ2] 
                  =  (λL1.L
*.W / ∆.
*
1 K ).Z.[λL1.θK2 + λL2.t.σ2] 
                      <  0  iff Z  <  0. 
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